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Abstract: New methodology for risk based approach to integrity assessment of pressure vessels has been introduced. Namely, the risk matrix has been defined with 
consequence taken as usual, whereas probability has been separated into two, emphasizing effects of human factor and material defects. Toward this end, the failure 
assessment diagram (FAD) has been used here as a simple engineering tool to estimate probability of the failure due to material defects. Probability of failure due to 
human factor has been estimated according to the survey performed (with operators and managers) in the firm where pressure vessel is located and operated. With 
consequence estimated according to the simple standard procedure or by using more complex procedures (API 581, RIMAP), the novel risk based structural assessment 
has been completed. As an example, cylindrical storage tanks for compressed air are analysed. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Pressure vessels represent critical welded constructions 
from the point of view of eventual failure and possible 
catastrophic consequences. Even though probability of 
failure is very low, at least based on previous experience, 
risk is still not negligible, having in mind consequences, as 
explained in [1-2]. Risk based approach is often explained 
by the risk matrix, Fig. 1, using the simple definition of risk 
(product of probability and consequence). Even in that 
case, there are different options, some of them recently 
introduced [3-8], which turned out to be efficient and useful 
engineering tool, especially for managers when they have 
to make difficult decisions. Anyhow, simple methods do 
not provide precise solutions generally speaking. Contrary 
to that, more complicated ones (e.g. API procedure, [9, 10], 
or its European competitor, RIMAP, [11], both based on 
empirical rules), provide more precise solutions, but 
usually require too much effort and time. 
 










y VH Medium  High High Very high Very high 
H Low  Medium High High Very High 
M Low  Medium  Medium  High High 
L Very low  Low  Medium  Medium  High  
VL Verylow  Very low  Low  Medium  Medium  
Figure 1 Risk matrix 
 
Therefore, here we present yet another relatively 
simple method, based on new definition of risk matrix, i.e. 
new method to assess probability, interpreted here as 
twofold quantity. Namely, two most important factors for 
eventual failure of pressure vessels, human factor and 
material defects, are treated separately, "producing" two 
types of probability and thus new approach to risk 
assessment. Toward this end, the Failure Assessment Dia-
gram (FAD), Fig. 2, has been used here as simple engine-
ering tool to estimate probability of the failure due to 
material defects, taken as the function of the position of the 
operating point. Namely, probability of failure due to 
crack-like defect has been recently defined as the ratio 
between the distance of the operating point from the zero 
point, and the appropriate distance between the point on the 
limiting curve and zero point, [4-6]. This can be used 
regardless of defect existence, since one can also assume 
crack existence, just for the sake of a conservative 




Figure 2 Failure Assessment Diagram Eq. (5), derived and explained in [12] 
 
Probability of failure due to human factor can be 
estimated according to the survey performed in the firm 
where pressure vessel is located. Namely, it is also 
reasonable to assume that the probability of failure of 
pressure vessel is inverse proportion of human factor, if one 
takes for granted that operational staff have done 
everything to prevent failure. Actually in that case one can 
say the probability is 0, whereas in the opposite case, e.g. 
complete negligence of staff, probability is equal to 1. To 
assess any value in between, one can use answers given in 
a survey, based on questionnaire, as explained later.   
 
2 RISK BASED APPROACH – NEW METHODOLOGY 
 
In the risk matrix shown in Fig. 1, consequences and 
probabilities are categorized very low (VL), low (L), 
medium (M), high (H) to very high (VH). The risk is then 
taken as the product of these two, leading to differently 
marked fields, sometimes presented in different colours, 
green (VL & L), orange (M), brown (H) and red (VH). 
This is obviously an oversimplified and somewhat arbitrary 
approach, but popular in modern management practice, 
especially when first round of decision making process is 
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going on. Anyhow, since pressure vessels failures often 
have very heavy consequences, including fatalities, ecology 
disasters and doom day scenario for a firm, this problem 
certainly requires more complex analysis and more precise 
quantification of consequence and probability.  
 
Table 1 List of questions used in this research 
No Question 
1 I mostly report only major problems to my superiors 
2 My company does not have a precisely defined system according to 
which we are informed about lessons learned during failures and 
accidents. 
3 When taking over my shift, there is an exact procedure to which I 
must comply, related to obtaining of all the necessary information 
from the previous shift. 
4 When I am working under pressure, (breaking through deadlines 
and suffering financial losses), managers who communicate with us 
are fully focused on finishing our tasks as quickly as possible and do 
not warn us about following safety procedures. 
5 In my company, we often discuss process safety and managers ask 
for our opinions on the matter. 
6 I am fully aware of hazards for each individual material and 
equipment we are working with in the company. 
7 The subject of process safety is rarely discussed in meetings with 
the superiors. 
8 When missing deadlines and facing financial losses, our following 
of processes and process safety procedures is affected in the 
following way: 
1. All procedures are entirely and strictly followed regardless of the 
circumstances 
2. Most procedures are followed regardless of the delay, although 
some smaller rules may be overlooked 
3. Assessments are made about what can be skipped and what can 
be finished in a safe way 
4. The priority is to get the job done, while it is assumed that we will 
do everything we can to follow the main procedures 
5. No attention is paid to the procedures if the deadlines are 
significantly missed, the only thing that is important is to finish as 
soon as possible. 
9 Established rules about working hours and overtime are not always 
followed. 
10 During non-routine repairs we are always informed about hazards 
related to such work. 
11 During non-routine operations or repairs, following activities take 
place in our company: 
1.  One of the superiors supervises the work from beginning to end. 
2. One of the superiors is in charge of monitoring the operation from 
beginning to the end only if operation is regarded as highly risky, 
and if not, we just inform superiors how the repair is advancing. 
3. All non-routine repairs are monitored by the superiors from 
beginning to the end, but they do not have to be necessarily 
present and check them personally. 
4. We performn on-routine operations on our own, but must inform 
the superiors of any major steps that we undertake. 
5. We perform non-routine operations on our own and are 
responsible for finishing them properly 
12 Incidents or “near misses” that occur during maintenance are always 
thoroughly analyzed and we are involved in this analysis. 
13 Competences that were required from us in order to get the job are 
being checked after a given period of time spent working in the 
company. 
14 We sometimes perform tasks for which we are not competent. 
15 We undergo regular trainings for responding in the case of 
emergency (wherein we learn specific hazards related to our 
workplaces, how to identify them, how to act when we identify 
them and what kind of emergency response plan should be used in 
case of an accident). 
16 There are frequent drills during which the cases of emergancy are 
simulated and all employees participate in them. 
17 Whenever a process changes, or a new one is introduced, all 
employees undergo training about the hazards related to that 
process. 
18 There is a defined procedure for carrying out detailed investigations 
after an accident or failure happens in the company. 
 
Regarding consequence, instead of descriptive and 
somewhat arbitrary estimation based on several parameters 
(health, safety, environment, business, security), one can 
use technical data for a given pressure vessel (e.g. p, V, T, 
operating medium). In this way standard classification can 
be provided, from 0 to 4, naturally leading to five levels of 
consequence, defined in the risk matrix. 
Regarding probability, as already explained, it is 
separated into two major affecting factors, material defects 
and human factor. In the case of crack-like defects there is 
already new, interesting concept, based on fracture 
mechanics approach, applied recently for large spherical 
storage tank [6] and cylindrical pressure vessel [8], using 
the FAD to assess structural integrity of a cracked 
component.  The basic concept of FAD is to evaluate ratios 
between the stress intensity factor and fracture toughness 
(Y coordinate), which can be interpreted as the probability 
of brittle fracture, and between the local stress and its 
critical value (X coordinate), which can be interpreted as 
the probability of plastic collapse, Fig. 2. The point defined 
by these two coordinates is either in the safe or in the 
unsafe region, which are separated by the limit curve. 
Probability of failure can be estimated in the same way, as 
the ratio of the distance from the point to zero point and the 
distance from the corresponding point at the limit curve and 
zero point. 
Finally, as already explained, probability of failure 
due to human factor can be estimated according to the 
survey, based on questionnaire given in Tab. 1. Toward 
this end, especially designed questionnaire has been used 
to perform a survey in a number of firms running pressure 
vessels in everyday practice. Selected questions are 
presented in Tab. 1, whereas the complete questionnaire is 
presented and analysed in [13]. 
 
3 CASE STUDY – CYLINDRICAL PRESSURE VESSEL 
 
This pressure vessel has been used in Hydro Power 
Plant Bajina Basta, EPS, for many years before the regular 
NDT (radiography) has revealed non-acceptable defects 
according to standards, as shown in Fig. 3, and explained in 




Figure 3 a) pressure vessel with defects; b) cross section with defect 971-57 
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Consequence in this case is simple to evaluate because 
of the fact that eventual failure would cause catastrophic 
consequences, or in the best case, chaos, [15], but most 
probably fatalities as well. Therefore, it could be only VH 
consequence, even though contained medium is not 
harmful, i.e. toxic.  
To evaluate probability due to material defects, one of 
three most dangerous has been picked up, namely defect 
971-57, which has been identified as the lack of fusion, and 
is represented here as a through crack, Fig. 3b to enable 
conservative approach and simple 2D analysis, at the same 
time, using the following data: 
- Geometry: thickness t = 50 mm, diameter D = 2075 
mm; 
- Material: high strength low alloyed (HSLA) steel: Reh 
= 500 MPa, RM = 650 MPa; KIc= 1580 MPa√mm 
- Crack geometry: length 10 mm, circumferential weld 
–lack of fusion; 
- Loading: maximum pressure p = 8.1 MPa, residual 
stress σR = 175 MPa – maximum value transverse to 
the weld, in heat-affected-zone (HAZ). There is no 
data about post-weld-heat-treatment (PWHT), so the 
maximum possible value of residual stress, according 
to experience, has been applied, [14]. 
- Curvature effect is negligible (t/D = 50/2075 ≈ 
0.025). 
 
Having this in mind, the stress intensity factor is 
calculated as follows: KI = σ√πa; where σ is remote stress 
(σ = pR/2t + σR) = 259 MPa, a is crack half-length (5 mm): 
KI = (pR/2t + σR)√πa = 1026 MPa√mm, being 65% of KIc. 
Plastic collapse ratio has been calculated as follows: SR 
= σn/σF; σn = p∙R/2∙t = 84 MPa, no reduction cross-section 
(negligible), σF = (ReH + RM)/2 = 575 MPa; SR = 0.15. 
Thus, the coordinates are (0.15, 0.65), as shown in Fig. 4.  
Now, one can calculate the probability of failure, as the 
ratio between the distance of the operating point from the 
zero point, and the appropriate distance between the point 
on the limiting curve and zero point. The probability is 0.64 
for the point corresponding to design pressure (Very high 
risk, brown field in column VH, Tab. 1). 
 
 
Figure 4 Failure assessment diagram for cylindrical pressure vessel 
 
Three important effects now can be followed: 
1) Common practice in conservative approach is to 
assume double size of a defect, just for the case that 
operator has not evaluated the size correctly, leading 
to the point (0.15, 0.92) and the probability 0.91.  
2) Water proof test pressure (43% higher than the design 
pressure), raises probability from 0.64 to 0.75. 
3) If one neglects residual stresses, the point in FAD 
goes to much lower (deeper) part of the safe region, 
(0.15, 0.22), reducing probability to relatively low 
value (0.24). Therefore, in this case, water proof is 
not a problem, because it raises probability up to 
0.34, point (0.21, 0.31). 
 
Finally, for the probability of failure due to human 
factor effects, survey results are used, based on 18 
questions (Q1-Q18), listed in Tab. 1. Every answer is 
quantified from 1 to 5, some of them as "negative", and the 
remaining as "positive" (marked in red bold letters). The 
average value of replies is shown in row AV, second from 
the bottom, whereas the remaining value is shown in the 
bottom row, marked as RV. In the case of "negative" 
question, relevant quantity is given in the row RV, whereas 
in the case of "positive" question relevant value is given in 
the row AV. In both cases it was always the smaller value! 
Twenty replies (O1-O20) are taken as relevant for this 
purpose, and presented in Tab. 2. The whole questionnaire 
has been statistically analysed and presented in details in 
[13]. Based on that analysis, 20 operators have provided 
relevant answers, which are used here for further analysis. 
The average value for 20 operators and 18 questions 
(Q1-Q18) is then 23.5%. Now, we can introduce the third 
axis, in addition to already common two axes, or we can 
combine two probabilities into one, getting "standard" 
diagram, as shown in Fig. 1.  
In this case we will use standard risk matrix, because 
we have only one value for the probability due to human 
factor, not to mention also fixed value for the conse-
quence. Therefore, although there are 3 coordinates, 3D 
presentation would be obsolete, because for one pressure 
vessel there is only one coordinate for consequence and 
one for probability due to human factor. Therefore, in the 
case presented in this paper, the consequence is kept as 
VH, and probability to take into account the effect of 
human resources is re-calculated. Toward this aim, 
probabilities due to material defects, as well as probability 
due to human factor, have been subtracted from 1, and 
multiplied, to get "inverse" values, which are then 
"inversed" back to the final probabilities, as follows:  
- Point (0.15, 0.65): 1‒ (1‒0.64)∙(1‒0.235)=0.72  
- Point (0.15, 0.92): 1‒ (1‒0.91)∙(1‒0.235)=0.93  
- Point (0.21, 0.74): 1‒ (1‒0.75)∙(1‒0.235)=0.81  
- Point (0.15, 0.22): 1‒ (1‒0.24)∙(1‒0.235)=0.42  
- Point (0.21, 0.31): 1‒ (1‒0.34)∙(1‒0.235)=0.49  
 
Since all points are with VH consequence, one can see 
that, for the standard risk matrix presentation, points 
(0.15,0.22); and (0.21,0.31) are positioned in the high risk 
region, whereas the remaining three points are in the very 
high risk region, indicating detrimental effects of residual 
stresses, eventual misreading of NDT findings and/or water 
proof test.  
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Table 2 Results for the human factor effects based on questionnaire 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 
O1 3 2 2 3 4 4 3 1 5 2 4 3 3 5 4 4 4 4 
02 5 5 5 1 5 4 1 1 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 
O3 2 2 5 2 3 3 2 2 4 2 4 3 3 5 4 4 4 4 
O4 2 2 5 2 3 3 2 2 5 2 4 3 3 5 4 4 4 4 
O5 2 2 5 2 3 3 2 2 4 2 4 3 3 5 4 4 4 4 
O6 3 2 5 2 3 4 2 1 5 2 4 3 3 5 4 4 4 4 
O7 2 2 5 3 4 3 2 1 4 2 4 3 3 5 4 4 4 4 
O8 1 1 5 1 4 5 1 1 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
O9 2 2 5 1 5 5 1 1 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
O10 2 2 5 1 5 5 1 1 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
O11 3 1 5 4 4 5 2 2 4 2 4 5 4 5 3 4 5 4 
O12 3 1 5 2 3 2 3 2 4 2 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 
O13 3 1 5 2 2 4 2 2 4 2 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 5 
O14 1 1 5 1 1 5 2 4 5 1 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 
O15 2 2 5 1 3 5 1 1 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
O16 2 5 4 5 4 3 2 2 4 3 5 4 5 4 4 3 4 5 
O17 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 3 4 2 5 5 5 3 5 5 3 5 
O18 5 5 5 3 2 4 3 2 2 4 5 4 5 3 4 3 4 5 
O19 1 1 2 1 4 5 1 2 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
O20 5 5 5 3 2 4 3 2 2 4 5 4 5 3 4 3 4 5 
AV 0.54 0.49 0.93 0.45 0.66 0.80 0.40 0.35 0.86 0.38 0.93 0.85 0.85 0.91 0.87 0.85 0.87 0.90 




Based on the results shown here, one can conclude 
the following: 
- Risk matrix is simple, but useful engineering tool for 
assessment of pressure vessel integrity, based on 
definition of risk, i.e. consequence x probability. 
- Approach used here avoids unnecessary complicated 
procedures for consequence and probability calcu-
lation, i.e. risk evaluation. 
- The effects of water proof test pressure, residual 
stresses and/or  NDT readings, can be easily taken 
into account and quantified, completing the data 
needed by managers to make important decisions on 
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